A lot of effort has been made in the literature to remove the common prior assumption in Bayesian mechanism design -the assumption that the distributions of the players' private types are common knowledge to the designer and the players. In Bayesian auctions, dominantstrategy truthful mechanisms require that the seller has full information about the distributions. Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions, first considered by Azar, Chen and Micali (2012) , require that each player knows all the other players' distributions or their refinements. In all these studies, at least one agent (whether the seller or a player) needs to possess a large amount of information about the distributions for the seller to generate good revenue in the auction.
Introduction
Bayesian auction design has been an extremely flourishing area in game theory since the seminal work of [44] and [26] . One of the main focuses is to generate revenue, by selling m heterogenous items to n players. Each player has, as his private information, a valuation function describing how much he values each subset of the items. The valuations are drawn from prior distributions. An important assumption in Bayesian mechanism design is that the distributions are commonly known by the seller and the players -the common prior assumption. However, as pointed out by another seminal work [52] , such common knowledge is "rarely present in experiments and never in practice", and "only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality." 1 In an effort to remove this assumption, [4] first considered crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms, which only require that each player privately know the prior distribution (or a refinement of it). The seller can be ignorant and the prior may not be common knowledge among the players. Also without relying on a common prior, dominant-strategy truthful (DST) mechanisms [44, 49, 19, 41, 54, 13, 14] only requires that the seller know the prior distribution.
However, as each player's values reflect his private evaluation about the items based on the information he has, it is still a demanding requirement that some agent, whether the seller or a player, individually possesses good knowledge about all players' value distributions. As our main conceptual contribution, in this paper we consider a framework for auctions where knowledge about the players' value distributions are arbitrarily scattered among the players and the seller. The seller can no longer base his mechanism on a single agent's knowledge, and must really aggregate pieces of information from all players in order to gain a good understanding about the distributions.
More precisely, we focus on unit-demand auctions and additive auctions -two auction classes widely studied in the literature [18, 35] . A player's valuation function is specified by m values, one for each item. For each player i and item j, the value v ij is independently drawn from a distribution D ij . Each player privately knows his own values and some (or none) of the distributions of some other players for some items, like long-time competitors in the same market. There is no constraint about who knows which distributions. It is possible that nobody knows how the whole valuation profile is distributed, and some value distributions are not known by anybody. The seller may also know some of the distributions, but he does not know which player knows what.
We introduce directed knowledge graphs to succinctly describe the players' knowledge. Each player knows the distributions of his neighbors for specific items. Different items' knowledge graphs may be totally different, and the structures of the graphs are not known by anybody. Interestingly, the intuition behind the information setting that we formalize has long been considered by philosophers. In [40] , the author discussed a world where "everything in the world might be known by somebody, yet not everything by the same knower."
Under such an unstructured information setting, we are able to design mechanisms that aggregate all players' (and the seller's) knowledge and generate good revenue compared with the optimal Bayesian revenue when there is a common prior. Because our mechanisms literally "crowdsource" information from every player to fill in the jigsaw puzzle of the value distributions, we continue referring to them as crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms. However, compared with the original notion put forward in [4] , this notion now has a much broader and richer meaning. We formalize our model in Section 2. Below let us briefly introduce our main results.
Main Results
Crowdsourcing under arbitrary knowledge graphs. Our goal is to design 2-step dominant strategy truthful (2-DST) [4] crowdsourced mechanisms whose expected revenue approximates that of the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, denoted by OP T . 2 In order for the seller to aggregate the players' knowledge about the distributions, it is natural for the mechanism to ask each player to report his knowledge to the seller, together with his own values. A 2-DST mechanism is such that, (1) no matter what knowledge the players may report about each other, it is dominant for each player to report his true values; and (2) given that all players report their true values, it is dominant for each player to report his true knowledge about others. This is an extension of dominant-strategy truthfulness and a natural solution concept based on mutual knowledge of rationality.
When the players' knowledge is completely unconstrained, some distributions may not be known by anybody. In this case, it is easy to see that no crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism can be a bounded approximation to OP T . Accordingly, we introduce a new benchmark: the optimal BIC mechanism applied to players and items for whom the distributions are indeed known by somebody, denoted by OP T K . Note that this is a very natural benchmark when considering players with limited knowledge, and if every distribution is known by somebody then it is exactly OP T . We have the following theorems, formalized in Section 3. 
.
To prove Theorem 1, we actually prove a general theorem that converts a large class of Bayesian mechanisms into crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms.
Theorem 2. (informally stated)
Any Bayesian mechanism for unit-demand auctions that is a good approximation in the COPIES setting can be crowdsourced.
To prove Theorem 3, we have developed a novel approach for using the adjusted revenue [54] and proved the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6. (informally stated)
The optimal adjusted revenue can be crowdsourced.
Indeed, although the adjusted revenue has been very helpful in Bayesian auctions, it was unexpected that we found an interesting and highly non-trivial way of using it to analyze crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms.
Crowdsourcing when everything is known by somebody. When the amount of knowledge in the system increases, the seller may hope to generate more revenue by aggregating the players' knowledge. Indeed, if every distribution is known by somebody, then the benchmark OP T K is exactly OP T . Interestingly, we show that the revenue that can be generated by crowdsourced mechanisms increases gracefully together with the amount of knowledge. More precisely, we have the following theorems, formalized in Section 4.
Theorems 4 and 5. (sketched) ∀k ∈ [n − 1], when each distribution is known by at least k players, there is a 2-DST crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism for unit-demand auctions with revenue ≥ τ k 24 · OP T , and such a mechanism for additive auctions with revenue ≥ max{ 2 A Bayesian mechanism is BIC if it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all players to report their true values.
Future directions. In this paper we have strictly weakened the knowledge assumption about the seller and the players in Bayesian auctions, and provided important insights about the relationship between the amount of knowledge in the system and the achievable revenue. Since the common prior assumption implies that every player has correct and exact knowledge about all distributions, in our main results we do not consider scenarios where players have "insider" knowledge. If the insider knowledge is correct (i.e., is a refinement of the prior), then our mechanisms' revenue increases; see Appendix E. If the insider knowledge may be wrong, the problem is closely related to robust mechanism design [8] , which is a very important topic in game theory but not the focus of this paper. Still, how to aggregate even the incorrect information that the players may have about each other's distributions is a very interesting question for future studies.
Designing (approximately) optimal Bayesian mechanisms has been of great interest to computer scientists. A common prior is clean to work with, but it is well understood that this is a strong assumption. In some sense, our results show that this assumption is without much loss of generality if one is willing to give up some portion of the revenue, and this portion shrinks smoothly as the amount of knowledge increases. An important future direction is to "crowdsource" not only DST but also BIC mechanisms. For example, the BIC mechanisms in [26, 11, 12] are optimal in their own settings, and it is unclear how to convert them to crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms. As pointed out by [26] , the common prior assumption seems to be crucial for its mechanism.
Related Work
Bayesian auction design. In his seminal work [44] , Myerson introduced the first optimal Bayesian mechanism for single-good auctions with independent values, which also applies to many singleparameter settings [1] . Since then, there has been a huge literature on designing (approximately) optimal Bayesian mechanisms that are either DST or BIC, such as [26, 48, 49, 18, 38, 30, 17] ; see [36] for an introduction to this literature. Mechanisms for multi-parameter settings have been constructed recently. In [11, 12] , the authors characterize optimal BIC mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. For unit-demand auctions, [20, 19, 41, 13] construct DST Bayesian mechanisms that are constant approximations. For additive auctions, [35, 42, 5, 54, 13] provide logarithmic or constant approximations under different conditions. Moreover, [50] and [14] construct Bayesian mechanisms for sub-additive valuations.
Removing the common prior assumption. Following [52] , a lot of effort has been made in the literature trying to remove the common prior assumption in game theory [7, 51, 33] . Again, in DST Bayesian mechanisms it suffices to assume that the seller knows the prior distribution. Many works in this direction try to further weaken the assumption and consider settings where the seller may be totally ignorant. In prior-free mechanisms [37, 27] , the distribution is unknown and the seller learns about it from the values of randomly selected players. In [24, 29, 39, 28] , the seller observes independent samples from the distribution before the auction begins. In [22, 23] , the players have arbitrary possibilistic belief hierarchies about each other. In [21] , the seller can only access the distributions via specific oracle queries. In robust mechanism design [8, 2, 9] , the players have arbitrary probabilistic belief hierarchies. Finally, as mentioned, an earlier work of the first author of this paper considers a preliminary model for crowdsourced Bayesian auctions [4] : rather than allowing the distributions to be arbitrarily scattered among the players and the seller, each player privately knows all the distributions (or their refinements). It is a very special case of our model. Indeed, both the insights and the techniques in this paper are very different.
Information elicitation. Using proper scoring rules [10, 25, 32] as an important tool, a lot of effort has been devoted to information elicitation [45, 43, 46, 55] . Here each player reports his private information and his knowledge about the distribution of the other players' private information, and is rewarded based on everybody's report. Different from auctions, there are no allocations or prices for items, and a player's utility is equal to his reward. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a widely used solution concept in this literature. Many studies here rely on a common prior, but mechanisms without this assumption have also been investigated [53] . In some sense, our work can be considered as information elicitation in auctions without a common prior. Note that in information elicitation the players do not have any cost for revealing their knowledge. It would be interesting to include such costs in (their and) our model, to see how the mechanisms will change accordingly.
Our Model for Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions
In this work, we focus on multi-item auctions with n players and m items. A player i's value for an item j, v ij , is independently drawn from a distribution
Player i's value for a subset S of items is max j∈S v ij in unit-demand auctions, and is j∈S v ij in additive auctions. Our settings are downward closed [38] , the players' utilities (denoted by u i ) are quasi-linear, and the players are risk-neutral.
Knowledge graphs. It is illustrative to model the players' knowledge graphically. 4 More precisely, there is a vector of knowledge graphs, G = (G 1 , . . . , G m ), one for each item. Each G j is a directed graph with n nodes, one for each player, and edge (i, i ′ ) is in G j if and only if player i knows D i ′ j . A knowledge graph does not have self-loops: a player i's knowledge about his own value distributions is not considered. 5 There is no constraint about the structure of the knowledge graphs: the same player's distributions for different items may be known by different players, and different players' distributions for the same item may also be known by different players. Each player knows his own out-going edges, and neither the players nor the seller knows the whole graph.
We measure the amount of knowledge in the system by the number of players knowing each distribution. More precisely, for any k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , n − 1}, a knowledge graph is k-bounded if each node has in-degree at least k: a player's distribution is known by at least k other players. The vector G is k-bounded if all the knowledge graphs are k-bounded. Note that any knowledge graph is at least 0-bounded, and "everything is known by somebody" when k ≥ 1. The common prior assumption implies that all knowledge graphs are complete directed graphs, or (n − 1)-bounded, which is the strongest assumption in our model. The seller's knowledge can be naturally incorporated into the knowledge graphs by considering him as a special "player 0". All our mechanisms can easily utilize the seller's knowledge, and we will not further discuss this issue.
Crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms. Given the set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, the set M = {1, . . . , m} of items, and the distribution D, letÎ = (N, M, D) be the Bayesian auction instance and I = (N, M, D, G) a corresponding crowdsourced Bayesian instance, where G is a knowledge graph vector. Different from Bayesian mechanisms, which are given the distribution D as input, a crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism has neither D nor G as input. Instead, it asks each player i to report a valuation b i = (b i1 , . . . , b im ) and a knowledge
i ′ j -a distribution for the valuation subprofile v −i . K i may contain a special symbol "⊥" at some places, indicating that i does not know the corresponding distributions.
A crowdsourced mechanism maps a strategy profile (b i , K i ) i∈[n] to an allocation and a price profile, which may be randomized. To distinguish whether a mechanism M is a Bayesian or crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism, we explicitly write M(Î) or M(I). Again note that the latter does not mean M has D or G as input. The (expected) revenue of a mechanism M is denoted by Rev(M), and sometimes by E D Rev(M) to emphasize the distribution.
A crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism is 2-step dominant strategy truthful (2-DST) if
(1) For any player i, true valuation v i , valuation b i , knowledge K i , and strategy subprofile
(2) For any player i, true valuation v i , true knowledge K i , knowledge K ′ i , and knowledge subprofile
We could have defined the players' knowledge using the standard notion in epistemic game theory [34, 3, 31] : roughly speaking, the state space consists of all possible distributions of the valuation profile, and player i knows D i ′ j if he is in an information set where all distributions have the (i ′ , j)-th component equal to D i ′ j . However, the knowledge graph is a more succinct representation and is enough for the purpose of this work. 5 Player i may know his own distributions, but this knowledge is neither used by our mechanisms nor affecting i's strategies. 6 In Appendix C, we introduce scoring rules to our mechanisms so that the inequality is strict whenever
3 Crowdsourcing Under Arbitrary Knowledge Graphs
Our Knowledge-Based Revenue Benchmark
When the knowledge graphs can be totally arbitrary and may not even be 1-bounded, some distributions may not be known by anybody. It is not hard to see that in this case, no crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism can be a bounded approximation to OP T . Indeed, if all but one value distributions of the players are constantly 0, and if the only non-zero distribution, denoted by D ij , is unknown by anybody, then a Bayesian mechanism can find the optimal reserve price based on D ij , while a crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism can only set the price for player i based on the reported values of the other players, which are all 0. Accordingly, for arbitrary knowledge graphs, we define a natural revenue benchmark: the optimal Bayesian revenue on players and items for which the distributions are known in the crowdsourced setting. More precisely, letÎ = (N, M, D) be a Bayesian instance and 
Unit-Demand Auctions
For unit-demand auctions, sequential post-price truthful Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed by [19, 41] . If the seller directly asks the players to report both their values and knowledge in these mechanisms, and uses the reported distributions to set the prices, then a player may want to withhold his knowledge about the other players. By doing so, a player may prevent the seller from selling the items to the others, so that the items are still available when it is his turn to buy.
An immediate idea is to partition the players into two groups: a set of reporters who will not receive any item and is only asked to report their knowledge; and a set of potential buyers whose knowledge is never used. Because of the structures of the knowledge graphs and the partition of the players, the reported knowledge may not cover a potential buyer i's value distributions on all items, and the seller will not sell to i the items for which his distributions are not reported. Thus, the technical part is to prove that the seller generates a good revenue even though the players' knowledge is only partially recovered.
Our mechanism M CSU D is simple and intuitive, as defined in Mechanism 1, where mechanism M U D is the Bayesian mechanism in [41] . This is not a black-box reduction from arbitrary Bayesian mechanisms: instead, we prove a projection lemma that allows such a reduction from an important class of Bayesian mechanisms. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix A.1. 
Randomly partition the players into two sets, N 1 and N 2 , where each player is independently put in each set with probability For each player i ′ ∈ N 2 and item j ∈ M , if D ′ i ′ j has not been defined yet and
, with the players' values being (b ij ) i∈N 3 ,j∈M . Let x ′ = (x ′ ij ) i∈N 3 , j∈M be the resulting allocation where x ′ ij ∈ {0, 1}, and let p ′ = (p ′ i ) i∈N 3 be the prices. Without loss of generality,
For each player i ∈ N 3 , i gets no item and his price is p i = 0. 10: For each player i ∈ N 3 , i gets item j if x ′ ij = 1, and his price is
does not depend on his own strategy. As mechanism M U D is DST and player i is assigned to N 2 with positive probability, it is dominant for him to report his true values in M CSU D , no matter what the reported knowledge profile (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is. Moreover, if a player i ends up in N 1 , then he is guaranteed to get no item and pay 0, thus reporting his true knowledge never hurts him.
Remark. Given how we have disentangled the usage of a player's value and the usage of his knowledge, and because we are not rewarding a player for reporting his knowledge, a player's knowledge does not affect his own utility in the current mechanism. So reporting his true knowledge neither hurts nor benefits a player. In the appendix, we use scoring rules to reward a player i's knowledge. Given that the other players report their true values, their reported values are distributed exactly according to the true distributions. Thus player i's utility will be strictly larger when he reports his true knowledge than when he lies.
To analyze the revenue of M CSU D , note that it runs the Bayesian mechanism on a smaller Bayesian instance:Î projected to the set of player-item pairs (i, j) such that i ∈ N 3 and D ij has been reported. To understand how much revenue is lost by the projection, we consider the COPIES instance [19] ,Î CP = (N CP , M CP , D CP ), which was used to analyze Bayesian mechanisms.Î CP is obtained fromÎ by replacing each player with m copies and each item with n copies, where a player i's copy j only wants item j's copy i, with the value distributed according to D ij . ThusÎ CP is a single-parameter auction, with
We now lower-bound the optimal Bayesian revenue of the projected COPIES instance. More specifically, for any subset N M ⊆ N ×M , letÎ CP N M beÎ CP projected to N M , and let OP T (Î CP ) N M be the revenue of the optimal Bayesian mechanism forÎ CP obtained from players in N M .
Lemma 2 (The projection lemma). For anyÎ and
We elaborate the related definitions and prove Lemma 2 in Appendix A.1. For mechanism M CSU D , the subset N M needed in the projection lemma is exactly the set of player-item pairs (i, j) such that i ∈ N 3 and D ij is reported. Theorem 1 holds by combining the projection lemma, the random partitioning in the mechanism, and existing results on the COPIES setting in Bayesian auctions [41, 13] .
Note that Lemma 2 is only concerned with COPIES instances. Using this lemma and similar to our proof of Theorem 1, any Bayesian mechanism M whose revenue can be properly lower-bounded by the COPIES instance can be converted to a crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism in a black-box way. It is interesting that the COPIES setting serves as a bridge between Bayesian and crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms. More precisely, we have the following theorem, with the proof omitted.
Theorem 2. Let M be any DST Bayesian mechanism such that Rev(M(Î)) ≥ αOP T (Î CP ) for some α > 0. There exists a 2-DST crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism that uses M as a black-box and is a α 16 -approximation to OP T K . By Theorem 2, the mechanisms in [18] and [19] automatically imply corresponding crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms. Finally, for single-good auctions, by replacing mechanism M U D with Myerson's mechanism, the crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism is a 4-approximation to OP T K .
Additive Auctions
Crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms for additive auctions are harder to construct and analyze than for unit-demand auctions. For example, randomly partitioning the players as before may cause a significant revenue loss, because the revenue of additive auctions may come from selling a subset of items as a bundle to a player i. Even if player i's value distribution for each item is reported with constant probability, the probability that his value distributions for all items in the bundle are reported can be very low, thus the mechanism can rarely sell the bundle to i at the optimal price. Also, the seller can no longer "throw away" player-item pairs whose distributions are not reported and work on the projected instance I ′ -recall that
Indeed, when the players are not partitioned into reporters and potential buyers, doing so will cause a player to withhold his knowledge about others so that they are thrown away.
To simultaneously achieve truthfulness and a good revenue guarantee, our mechanism is very stingy and never throws away any information. If a player i's value distribution for an item j is reported by others, then j may be sold to i via the β-Bundling mechanism in [54] , denoted by Bund; while if i's distribution for j is not reported, then j may still be sold to i via the second-price mechanism. Indeed, our mechanism treats the players neither solely based on the original Bayesian instanceÎ not solely based on the projected instance I ′ ; rather, it works on a hybrid of the two.
Our mechanism M CSA is still simple, as defined in Mechanism 2. However, significant effort is needed in order to analyze its revenue. Although the Bayesian mechanism Bund is a constant approximation to the optimal Bayesian revenue, some items that are sold by Bund under I ′ may end up being sold by M CSA using second-price, and the revenue of M CSA cannot be lower-bounded by that of Bund under I ′ . To overcome this difficulty, we develop a novel way to use the adjusted revenue [54] in our analysis; see Lemmas 4 and 6 in Appendix A.2, where we also recall the related definitions. As we show, the adjusted revenue in properly chosen information settings and the revenue of the second-price sale combined together eventually provide a lower-bound to the revenue of M CSA . More precisely, we have the following theorem, proved in Appendix A.2. 
.
Note that in mechanism M CSA , when computing the entry fee and the reserve prices for player i according to mechanism Bund, the value distributions D ′ i are from the projected Bayesian instance I ′ , while the threshold prices β i are defined by the players' values from the original Bayesian instanceÎ. Moreover, player i's winning set M i is defined by his values fromÎ, while only i's values from the reported distributions are used in the bundling sale. Indeed, the mechanism has carefully
For each item j, set i * (j) = arg max i b ij (ties broken lexicographically) and p j = max i =i * b ij . 3: for each player i do
4:
Let M i = {j | i * (j) = i} be player i's winning set.
5:
Partition M into M 1 i and M 2 i as follows: ∀j ∈ M 1 i , some i ′ has reported D i ′ ij = ⊥ (if there are more than one reporters, take the lexicographically first); and ∀j ∈ M 2 i ,
Compute the optimal entry fee e i and reserve prices
By the definition of Bund, we always have p ′ j ≥ β ij for each j. If e i = 0 then it is possible that p ′ j > β ij for some j; while if e i > 0 then p ′ j = β ij for every j.
8:
Sell M 1 i ∩ M i to player i according to Bund. That is, if e i > 0 then do the following: if
, player i gets item j with price p ′ j ; otherwise item j is not sold.
9:
In addition, sell each item j in M 2 i ∩ M i to player i with price p j (= β ij ). 10: end for mixed up the original Bayesian instance and the projected instance, in order to achieve truthfulness and good revenue at the same time.
Finally, we believe that by following the framework of [13] , one may be able to do a better analysis for our mechanism M CSA and prove a better approximation ratio for it. However, the analysis is far from being a black-box application of existing results and requires the "hybridization" of the counterpart of the adjusted revenue there.
Crowdsourcing When Everything Is Known by Somebody
When the knowledge graph vector G is k-bounded with k ≥ 1, "everything is known by somebody" and OP T K = OP T . Both mechanisms in Section 3 of course apply here, but we can do better when k gets larger: that is, when the amount of knowledge in the system increases. More specifically, for
4 and τ k → 1.
Unit-Demand Auctions
The case of unit-demand auctions is easy: our mechanism M ′ CSU D is almost the same as mechanism M CSU D , except that it randomly partitions the players into N 1 and N 2 in a different way. The probability that each player is assigned to N 1 is now q = 1 − (k + 1) − 1 k , and the probability to N 2 is 1 − q. When k = 1, we have q = 1 2 and mechanism M ′ CSU D is exactly M CSU D . The probability q is chosen to achieve the maximum probability for each distribution to be reported, and the latter is exactly τ k . We have omitted the detailed description of the new mechanism and only state the theorem below, which is proved in Appendix B.1.
Remark. As k gets larger (although can still be much smaller than n), the approximation ratio of M ′ CSU D approaches 24, the best known approximation to OP T by DST Bayesian mechanisms [13] . Moreover, by Lemma 5 of [19] , M ′ CSU D is a τ k 6 -approximation to the optimal deterministic DST Bayesian mechanism.
Additive Auctions
Additive auctions here are again more difficult than unit-demand auctions, but still easier than the case when the knowledge graphs can be totally arbitrary. When k ≥ 1, all distributions will be reported in our mechanism M CSA . Thus no item is sold according to the second-price mechanism, and M CSA 's outcome is the same as the β-Bundling mechanism of [54] applied to the original Bayesian instanceÎ.
To improve the approximation ratio when k ≥ 1, following [13] we can divide the β-Bundling mechanism into the "bundling part" and the "individual sale part". The former is referred to as the Bundle VCG mechanism, denoted by BV CG; and the latter is the Individual 1-Lookahead mechanism, denoted by M 1LA , which sells each item separately using the 1-Lookahead mechanism of [49] . Mechanism M 1LA can also be replaced by the Individual Myerson mechanism, denoted by IM , which sells each item separately using Myerson's mechanism. By choosing the mechanism that generates a higher expected revenue between IM and BV CG, [13] provides a Bayesian mechanism that is an 8-approximation to OP T .
For crowdsourced Bayesian auctions, we can easily "crowdsource" mechanism BV CG following mechanism M CSA . The resulting mechanism is denoted by M CSBV CG and defined in Appendix B.2 (Mechanism 6). Moreover, we can easily "crowdsource" mechanism IM , similar to mechanism M ′ CSU D . The resulting mechanism is denoted by M CSIM and also defined in the appendix. Because the seller does not know the prior D, he cannot compute the expected revenue of the two crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms and choose the better one. Instead, we let him choose between the two mechanisms randomly, according to a probability distribution depending on k.
However, we can do even better. Indeed, although in Bayesian auctions the mechanism IM is optimal for individual item-sale and outperforms mechanism M 1LA , in crowdsourced Bayesian auctions there is a tradeoff between the two. In order for the players to report their knowledge truthfully for mechanism IM , we need to randomly partition them into reporters and potential buyers, thus each distribution is only recovered with probability τ k . In contrast, no partition is needed for aggregating the players' knowledge in mechanism M 1LA , and we can recover all distributions simultaneously with probability 1. The resulting crowdsourced mechanism, M CS1LA , is defined in the appendix. As mechanism M 1LA is a 2-approximation to mechanism IM , sometimes it is actually more advantageous to use M CS1LA rather than M CSIM , depending on the value of k.
Properly combining the above gadgets together, our mechanism M ′ CSA is defined as follows: when k ≤ 7, it runs M CSBV CG with probability 2 11 and M CS1LA with probability 9 11 ; when k > 7, it runs M CSBV CG with probability
and M CSIM with probability 3 3+τ k . The choice of the two cases is to achieve the best approximation ratio for each k. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.2.
Single-Good Auctions
As we have seen, the amount of revenue our mechanisms generate increases with k, the amount of knowledge in the system. If the knowledge graph is only k-bounded for some small k, but reflects certain combinatorial structures, good revenue may also be generated by leveraging such structures. In this subsection we consider single-good auctions, so a player's value v i is a single number rather than a vector. Following Lemma 8 in Appendix B.2, for any k ≥ 1, when there is a single item and the knowledge graph is k-bounded, mechanism M CSIM is a τ k -approximation to the optimal Bayesian mechanism of Myerson [44] . Below we construct a crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism that is nearly optimal under a natural structure of the knowledge graph.
More precisely, recall that a directed graph is strongly connected if there is a directed path from any node i to any other node i ′ . Intuitively, in a knowledge graph this means that for any two players Alice and Bob, Alice knows a guy who knows a guy ... who knows Bob. Also recall that a directed graph is 2-connected if it remains strongly connected after removing any single node and the adjacent edges. In a knowledge graph, this means there does not exist a crucial player as an "information hub", without whom the players will split into two parts, with one part having no information about the other. It is easy to see that strong connectedness and 2-connectedness respectively imply 1-boundedness and 2-boundedness, but not vice versa. In fact, a graph of n nodes can be (⌊ n 2 ⌋ − 1)-bounded without being connected. When the knowledge graph is 2-connected, we construct the Crowdsourced Myerson mechanism M CSM in Mechanism 3. Recall that Myerson's mechanism maps each player i's reported value b i to the (ironed) virtual value, φ i (b i ; D i ). It runs the second-price mechanism with reserve price 0 on virtual values and maps the resulting "virtual price" back to the winner's value space, as his price.
Each player i reports a value b i and a knowledge
If S = ∅, the item is unsold, the mechanism sets price p i = 0 for each i ∈ N and stop here. 
If S ′ = ∅ then go to Step 12.
8:
10:
, with ties broken lexicographically. 11: end while 12: Set φ second = max j∈N \({a,i * }∪N ′ ) φ j (b j ; D ′ j ) and the price p i = 0 for each player i.
then the item is unsold; otherwise, the item is sold to player i * and p i * = φ
To help understanding our mechanism, we illustrate in Figure 2 of Appendix B.3 the sets of players involved in the first round. We have the following theorem, proved in the appendix. 
Proof ideas. The mechanism again disentangles the use of the players' values and the use of their knowledge. Indeed, when computing a player's virtual value in Step 10, his knowledge has not been used yet. If he is player i * then his knowledge will not be used in the next round either. Only when a player is removed from S -that is, when it is guaranteed that he will not get the item, will his knowledge be used. This is why it never hurts a player to report his true knowledge. Now consider the revenue when the players report their true values and true knowledge. Note that |S| ≥ 2 in Step 2 due to 2-connectedness, so the mechanism does not stop in Step 3. In the iterative steps, because player i * is excluded from the set of reporters, we need that there is still a reporter who knows a distribution for players in N ′ : that is, there is an edge from (N \ N ′ ) \ {i * } to N ′ , and player i * is not an "information hub" between N \ N ′ and N ′ . This is again guaranteed by 2-connectedness (note that strong connectedness alone is not enough). Accordingly, M CSM does not stop until N ′ = ∅ and all players' distributions have been reported (excluding, perhaps, that of player a). Therefore M CSM manages to run Myerson's mechanism after randomly excluding a player a, and the revenue guarantee follows.
Remark. If the seller knows at least two distributions, the mechanism can use him as the starting point and the revenue will be exactly OP T . Since no crowdsourced mechanism can be a ( 1 2 + δ)-approximation for any constant δ > 0 when n = 2 [4] , our result is tight. Interestingly, after obtaining our result, we found that 2-connected graphs have been explored several times in the game theory literature [6, 47] , for totally different problems.
For additive auctions, when the knowledge graphs are 2-connected, instead of using mechanism M CS1LA or M CSIM , one can use M CSM for each item j. We thus have the following corollary, where the mechanism M ′′ CSA runs M CSM with probability 
, where the expectation is taken over the mechanism's random coins.
Proof. If player i is not in N 3 given the mechanism's randomness and the reported knowledge of all players, then his reported valuation is never used to compute his allocation or price, and he gets the same utility for reporting any valuation. Thus
If player i is in N 3 , then his utility is determined by M U D . If D ′ ij is defined to be 0 with probability 1 in Step 7, then i's reported value for item j is not given to M U D as input, and i gets the same utility for reporting any value for j, including v ij . Moreover, because i does not get such an item j, his utility is the same as an imaginary playerî whose valuation is the same as i's, except that the true value ofî for j is 0. Since M U D is DST, no matter what the distributions are and what values the other players report, it is the best forî to report his true valuation. Accordingly, it is the best for i to report his true valuation v i as well. That is,
Combining these two cases, Claim 1 holds.
We now prove the second requirement in the solution concept: given that all players report their true valuations, it is the best for a player to report his true knowledge.
Claim 2. For any player i, true valuation
Proof. If player i is in N 1 , then he is guaranteed to get no item and pay 0, so his utility is 0 no matter which knowledge he reports. If player i is in N 2 , then his knowledge is never used, and he again gets the same utility no matter which knowledge he reports.
and Claim 2 holds. Lemma 1 follows directly from Claims 1 and 2.
The COPIES setting. Before analyzing the revenue of mechanism M CSU D , we first recall the COPIES setting for reducing multi-parameter settings to single-parameter settings [19] . Given a unit-demand auction instanceÎ = (N, M, D), the corresponding COPIES instance is constructed as follows. We make m copies for each player, called player copies, and denote the resulting player set by N CP = N × M . We make n copies for each item, called item copies, and denote the resulting item set by M CP = M × N . Each player copy (i, j) has value v ij ∼ D ij for the item copy (j, i), and 0 for all the other item copies.
The set of feasible allocations in the original unit-demand auction naturally defines the set of feasible allocations in the COPIES auction: for any feasible allocation A in the original setting, if player i gets item j, then in the corresponding allocation in the COPIES setting, player i's copy j gets item j's copy i, and all other copies of i get nothing. Since in the original setting each item is sold to at most one player, in the COPIES setting, for all copies of the same item, at most one of them is sold. Moreover, since each player gets one item in the original setting, in the COPIES setting, for all copies of the same player, at most one of them gets an item copy. We denote bŷ
The projected setting. Next, we consider the optimal Bayesian revenue for the COPIES setting when "projected" to smaller instances. Let N M ⊆ N × M be a subset of player-item pairs and
be the COPIES instance corresponding toÎ N M . It can also be considered asÎ CP projected to N M . That is, when projecting a COPIES instance to a set of player-item pairs, we still want the resulting instance to be a COPIES instance, thus we patch it up with the missing player-item pairs but with values constantly 0. The relations of these instances are illustrated in Figure 1 . We are interested in the optimal Bayesian revenue underÎ CP N M , OP T (Î CP N M ). ∈ N M , the price paid by the j-th copy of player i is not counted, even though this player copy may get the i-th copy of item j according to the optimal mechanism forÎ CP . We have the following lemma, where we explicitly write out the distributions for different Bayesian instances. 
Proof. Given the instanceÎ CP N M , consider a Bayesian mechanism M ′ as follows:
• Patch up the instance to be exactlyÎ CP , including changing the distribution D ′ ij from 0 to D ij for any (i, j) with i ∈ N ′ and (i, j) / ∈ N M ;
• For any (i, j) ∈ N M , let i's copy j report his value, while for any (i, j) ∈ N M , sample the value of i's copy j from D ij ;
• Run the optimal DST Bayesian mechanism onÎ CP , with the reported and the sampled values; 7
• Project the resulting outcome to N M .
The key is to show that M ′ is a DST Bayesian mechanism forÎ CP N M . Indeed, for any (i, j) such that i ∈ N ′ and (i, j) / ∈ N M , the value of i's copy j inÎ CP N M is 0 with probability 1, his reported value is not used by M ′ , and at the end this player copy gets nothing and pays 0. Therefore it is dominant for this player copy to report his true value 0. For any (i, j) ∈ N M , the utility of i's copy j under M ′ is the same as that under the optimal DST Bayesian mechanism onÎ CP . As it is dominant for this player copy to report his true value in the latter, so is it in M ′ . Accordingly,
by the definition of OP T . By construction we have
thus Lemma 2 holds.
Note that the projection lemma is not true for non-COPIES settings in general, because the corresponding mechanism M ′ is not DST. Indeed, when the same player i has (i, j) ∈ N M and (i, j ′ ) / ∈ N M for some items j and j ′ , he prefers receiving j to receiving j ′ in the patched-up auction, even if the former leads to a smaller utility: his projected utility will be 0 under the latter. Now we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 1. 
For any player i and item j with D ij known by some other players, we have
where the inequality is because there exists at least one player i ′ with (i ′ , i) ∈ G j , and players i and i ′ are partitioned independently. Below we use N M 3 to denote the set of player-item pairs whose distribution is reported in the mechanism: that is, the set of players N 3 together with their reported items. Accordingly,
Also, we use ) be the unit-demand instance given to M U D in Step 8. Note that it is exactly I ′ projected to N M 3 : that is,
LetÎ CP
) be the COPIES instance corresponding toÎ N M 3 . Following [41] , given any set N M 3 , the revenue of M U D under the unit-demand Bayesian instanceÎ N M 3 is a 6-approximation to the optimal revenue for the COPIES instance. That is, for any N M 3 ,
Combining Inequalities 2 and 3, we have
By Lemma 2,
Let P ij (OP T (I ′CP )) be the price paid by player i's copy j under the optimal mechanism for I ′CP . We can rewrite the right-hand side of Equation 5 as follows.
where the first equality is by the definition of the projection, the second is because sampling from D CP is done independently from N M 3 , and the third is because P ij (OP T (Î CP )) does not depend on N M 3 . We can further lower-bound the last term of Equation 6 as follows:
Here the first equality is because P ij (OP T (I ′CP )) = 0 for every (i, j) such that D ij is unknown, the first inequality is by Equation 1, the second equality is by the definition of revenue, and the second inequality is because OP T (I ′CP ) ≥ OP T (I ′ ) 4
by [13] . Combining Equations 4, 5, 6 and 7, we have
and Theorem 1 holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 3. Mechanism M CSA is 2-DST.
Proof. The structure of a detailed proof for Lemma 3 will be following the two requirements in the solution concept and similar to that of Lemma 1. Thus we only highlight the key points here.
For
i is just part of the two mechanisms, Bund and second-price, again with the other players' values taken to be b −i . Thus, it is dominant for i to report his true values for M 1 i , following the truthfulness of Bund; and it is dominant for him to report his true values for M 2 i , following the truthfulness of the second-price mechanism.
Moreover, given that all players truthfully report their values, for each player i, reporting his true knowledge never hurts him, no matter what knowledge the other players report. Indeed, the winning set M i only depends on the players' reported values. Player i's reported knowledge may affect how M is partitioned into M 1 i ′ and M 2 i ′ for another player i ′ , but does not affect the sets M 1 i and M 2 i , or whether he gets some items or not, or the prices he pays. Thus M CSA is 2-DST as desired.
The adjusted revenue. To lower-bound the expected revenue of M CSA , we first introduce several important concepts following [54] .
For any single-player Bayesian instanceÎ i = ({i}, M, D i ) and any non-negative reserve-price vector β i = (β ij ) j∈M , a single-player DST Bayesian mechanism is β i -exclusive if it never sells an item j to i whenever his bid for j is no larger than β ij . Denote by Rev X (Î i , β i ) the optimal β i -exclusive revenue forÎ i : that is, the superior over the revenue of β i -exclusive mechanisms.
For any single-player DST Bayesian mechanism, its β i -adjusted revenue onÎ i is its revenue minus its social welfare generated from player-item pairs (i, j) such that i's bid for j is no larger than β ij . Denote by Rev A (Î i , β i ) the optimal β i -adjusted revenue forÎ i : that is, the superior over the β i -adjusted revenue of all single-player DST Bayesian mechanisms. Note that if a mechanism is β i -exclusive, then its β i -adjusted revenue is exactly its revenue.
Given a Bayesian instanceÎ = (N, M, D), for each player i and valuation subprofile
Note that we are slightly abusing notations here: each β ij is now a function rather than a value. The optimal β-adjusted revenue forÎ is
When v −i is clear from the context, we may simply write β i and β ij . Because we also consider the projected Bayesian instance I ′ = (N, M, D ′ ), let v ′ be v projected on the knowledge graph G: that is, v ′ ij = v ij if there exists a player i ′ with (i ′ , i) ∈ G j , and v ′ ij = 0 otherwise. As v is distributed according to D, v ′ is distributed according to D ′ . Thus we sometimes directly sample v ′ ∼ D ′ rather than sample v first and then map it to v ′ . Let
for each player i and item j. The optimal β ′ -adjusted revenue for I ′ is defined respectively:
It is important to emphasize that, given v −i and β i (v −i ), the optimal β i -exclusive revenue and the optimal β i -adjusted revenue are well defined for any Bayesian instance for player i, whether it isÎ i or I ′ i . In particular, we will consider Rev X (I ′ i , β i ) and Rev A (I ′ i , β i ), which are on the hybrid ofÎ i and I ′ i . The optimal β-adjusted revenue on the hybrid ofÎ and I ′ are similarly defined:
To highlight that in the inner expectation, player i's value is v ′ i even if it is obtained by first sampling v i ∼ D i and then projecting on G, we may also write it as
Finally, denote by IM the Individual Myerson mechanism, which sells each item separately using Myerson's mechanism [44] . The revenue of IM under the projected Bayesian instance I ′ , denoted by IM (I ′ ), is thus the optimal revenue by selling each item separately.
Having defined the notions and notations needed in our proof, we prove Theorem 3 via the following two technical lemmas. For each lemma, note that on the left-hand side the values are drawn from the original Bayesian instance, and on the right-hand side the values are drawn from the projected instance. 
. Combining this inequality with Lemmas 4 and 5, we have
and Theorem 3 holds.
Below we prove the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 4. For each player i, the set M 1 i of items for which i's distributions are reported and the set M 2 i of items for which i's distributions are not reported are uniquely determined by the knowledge graph G in I.
) be the single-player Bayesian instance obtained by projecting I ′ on i and
where Bund i is Bund applied to player i in Steps 7 and 8. The first equality is by the construction of M CSA . The second equality holds because in the execution of Bund i the items in M 2 i do not affect anything, as player i's values for them are constantly 0 in D ′ i . By Theorem 6.1 of [54] , for any single-player Bayesian instance for a player i and any β i , Bund i is an 8.5-approximation to the optimal β i -exclusive revenue for this instance. Moreover, by Theorem 1 of [54] , the optimal β i -exclusive revenue is an 8-approximation to the optimal β i -adjusted revenue for the same instance. Accordingly, we have
The second equality above is because D ′ i and D i are the same when only M 1 i is concerned, and v ′ ij = v ij for all j ∈ M 1 i . The first inequality is by the relation between Bund i and Rev X . The next equality is because i's values for items in M 2 i are always 0 under I ′ i , thus even when these items are available, a β-exclusive mechanism does not sell them to i anyway. The second inequality is by the relation between Rev X and the Rev A . The next equality is because, as mentioned before, when sampling v i from D i and then projecting it on G, the resulting v ′ i is distributed according to D ′ i . Now we state the key lemma in our analysis, which connects the hybrid adjusted revenue with that for
Before proving Lemma 6, note that combining it with Equations 8 and 9 we have
Thus Lemma 4 holds.
Next we prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. Arbitrarily fixing a player i and v ′ −i ∼ D ′ −i , let M * be the single-player DST Bayesian mechanism with the optimal β ′ i -adjusted revenue for I ′ i . 8 Accordingly, M * maximizes the following quantity:
where q ij is the probability for i to get item
Again because sampling v from D and projecting it on G induces the same distribution for v ′ as D ′ , we have
where we explicitly include v ′ i in the input of M * to emphasize the projection. Arbitrarily fix v −i and let
wise). For any v i and the corresponding v
8 If the superior is not achieved by any mechanism, one can take a sequence of mechanisms whose β ′ i -adjusted revenue approaches the superior in the limit.
Combining Equations 11, 12, 13 and taking summation over all players, we have
The first inequality above is because the first two terms in the expectation is exactly the β-adjusted revenue of mechanism M * on I ′ i . The following equality holds because v ′ ij = v ij for any j ∈ M 1 i . Finally, the second inequality is because 0 ≤ q ij ≤ 1 for any i, j.
Arbitrarily fix a valuation profile v and consider the term . We show that each item j appears in the summation at most once. Indeed, for each v ij that appears in the summation, j ∈ M 1 i and D ij is known in I. As v ij > β ′ ij , player i has strictly higher value for j than any other player i ′ whose distribution for j is also known. For any such player i ′ , β ′ i ′ j = v ij > v i ′ j and j is not in the set {j ∈ U i ′ : β ′ i ′ j < v i ′ j ≤ β i ′ j }, which implies that v i ′ j does not appear in the summation. Moreover, for any player i ′′ = i with D i ′′ j unknown, j / ∈ M 1 i ′′ j and v i ′′ j does not appear in the summation either. Therefore item j only appears once in the summation. Accordingly,
We now show that
where the right-hand side is exactly the revenue generated by mechanism M CSA in Step 9 and also the desired term in the statement of Lemma 6. Indeed, for each v ij that appears in the left-hand side, because v ij ≤ β ij , player i's value for j is at most the second highest among all players. Letting i * = arg max i ′ =i v i ′ j with ties broken lexicographically, we have β ij = v i * j and v i * j is the highest value for j among all players. Since β ′ ij < β ij , D i * j is unknown and j ∈ M 2 i * . Below we show j ∈ M i * , which then implies j ∈ M 2 i * ∩ M i * and the price paid by i * in Step 9 for item j is
When the distributions are generic, there are no ties in the players' values and v i * j is the unique maximum value for j, thus j ∈ M i * . For arbitrary distributions, problems occur when v ij = β ij and i < i * , which implies j / ∈ M i * . To deal with this special case, consider the following tie-breaking method for the players: while the value β ij is still defined to be v i * j , we denote it by β [54] and above continue to hold with respect to this tie-breaking method. Now for any v ij that appears in the summation, either we have v ij < β ij or we have v ij = β ij and i * < i, thus it is always the case that j ∈ M i * .
Accordingly, and β ij . Accordingly, letting D j = ×(D ij ) i∈N and v j ∼ D j for each item j, we have
Arbitrarily fixing an item j, we show that
To do so, by definition, if j ∈ M 1 i for a player i then in the Bayesian instance I ′ i,j and given the reserve price β ′ ij , the 1-Lookahead mechanism tries to sell j to i at price 9
where the second equality is again by sampling v j from D j and projecting on G to get v ′ j . We write
we divide the last term in Equation 20 into two parts, depending on whether r
9 Strictly speaking, under the Bayesian instance I ′ , the Individual 1-Lookahead mechanism for item j works as follows. Given v ′ j ∼ Dj , it finds the highest bidder i for j with ties broken lexicographically, as well as the second highest bid which is exactly β 
For the r
The first equality above is by distinguishing whether β ij ≤ v ′ ij or not. The second equality is because
The inequality is because r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) < β ij following the indicator in the first term and r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) ≤ v ij following the indicator in the second term. Finally, the last equality is because 
where the inequality is because on the Bayesian instanceÎ i,j and given the reserve price β ij , mechanism M 1LA chooses the optimal price r ij to maximize the expected revenue and is no worse than simply setting r ij = β ij . For the second term in Equation 22 , for any valuation profile v, if there exists a player i is such that the two indicators both equal to 1, then we have
Thus the (lexicographically first) highest bidder i * for j in v j has his distribution unknown, and j ∈ M 2 i * ∩ M i * ; and player i is the (lexicographically first) highest bidder for j in v ′ j , which is unique. Accordingly,
where the last equality is because i * is the unique player such that the indicator is 1. 
Combining the above two equations with Equation 22, for the r
′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) < β ij part in Equation 21 we have i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j E v ij ∼D ij I j∈M 1 i · I v ′ ij ≥r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) · I r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j )<β ij · r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) ≤ i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j I j∈M 1 i · I β ij >r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) E v ij ∼D ij Rev(M 1LA (Î i,j , β ij )) + E v j ∼D j i I j∈M 2 i ∩M i · max i ′ =i v i ′ j = i E v j ∼D j I j∈M 1 i · I β ij >r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) · Rev(M 1LA (Î i,j , β ij )) + I j∈M 2 i ∩M i · max i ′ =i v i ′ j . For the r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) ≥ β ij part in Equation 21, we immediately have r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) = r ij (v −i,j ) when the indicators are 1, because D ′ ij = D ij and v ′ ij = v ij whenever j ∈ M 1 i , and r ij (v −i,j ) maximizes the expected revenue over D ij conditional on v ij ≥ β ij . Thus i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j E v ij ∼D ij I j∈M 1 i · I v ′ ij ≥r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) · I r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j )≥β ij · r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j ) = i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j E v ij ∼D ij I j∈M 1 i · I v ij ≥r ij (v −i,j ) · I r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j )≥β ij · r ij (v −i,j ) = i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j I j∈M 1 i · I r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j )≥β ij E v ij ∼D ij I v ij ≥r ij (v −i,j ) · r ij (v −i,j ) = i E v −i,j ∼D −i,j I j∈M 1 i · I r ′ ij (v ′ −i,j )≥β ij E v ij ∼D ij Rev(M 1LA (Î i,j , β ij )) .
Combining the above two equations with Equation 21 and then Equation 20, we have
where the inequality is because M 1LA is a 2-approximation to Myerson's mechanism for each item [49] . Thus Lemma 5 holds.
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 1, thus most details are omitted. Below we only show that under the players' truthful strategies, the probability for each distribution D ij to be reported in mechanism M ′ CSU D is at least τ k . Indeed, for any player i and item j,
Combined with the proof of Theorem 1, Theorem 4 holds.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The Crowdsourced Individual Myerson Mechanism. We start by introducing the crowdsourced Individual Myerson mechanism M CSIM , which runs the following mechanism M CSIM,j for each item j separately. Mechanism M CSIM,j is similar to M CSU D and M ′ CSU D , thus we have omitted many details in the analysis.
Mechanism 4 M
Randomly partition the players into two sets, N 1 and N 2 , where each player is independently put in N 1 with probability q = 1 − (k + 1)
and N 2 with probability 1 − q. 3: Let N 3 be the set of players in N 2 whose distributions are reported by some players in N 1 , and D ′ N 3 ,j be the vector of reported distributions. 4: Run Myerson's mechanism on the single-good Bayesian instanceÎ N 3 ,j = (N 3 , {j}, D ′ N 3 ,j ) with the values being (b ij ) i∈N 3 ; and use the resulting allocation and prices to sell to players in N 3 .
For each item j, let v j = (v ij ) i∈N , D j = (D ij ) i∈N ,Î j = (N, {j}, D j ) be the corresponding singlegood Bayesian instance, and I j = (N, {j}, D j , G j ) be the corresponding single-good crowdsourced Bayesian instance. Lemma 7 below is similar to Lemma 1 and we provide its statement only. N, M, D, G) , mechanism M CSIM,j is 2-DST for I j for each j ∈ M , and mechanism M CSIM is 2-DST for I.
Next, we consider the expected revenue of M CSIM .
Proof. By definition,
Accordingly, it suffices to show that for each item j,
Using ideas and notations similar to those in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we have
as desired. Thus Lemma 8 holds.
The Crowdsourced Individual 1-Lookahead Mechanism. Next, we introduce the crowdsourced 1-Lookahead mechanism M CS1LA , which runs the following mechanism M CS1LA,j for each item j separately. We will show that the revenue of M CS1LA matches that of mechanism M 1LA for any k ≥ 1.
Each player i reports a value b ij and a knowledge
If i * 's distribution is not reported, sell item j to him at price p second and halt here. 4: Otherwise, let D ′ i * j be the reported distribution for i * (if there are many reported distributions for him, take the one by the lexicographically first reporter).
price p i * ; otherwise the item is unsold.
Note that M CS1LA,j does not partition the players into two groups. Also, it is not exactly using the 1-Lookahead mechanism as a blackbox, because it has to handle boundary cases where the players' distributions are not all reported. When the players all tell the truth, all true distributions will indeed be reported. However, for the mechanism to be well defined, it has to know what to do in all possible cases. Moreover, running the 1-Lookahead mechanism on the set of players whose distributions are reported is not 2-DST: for example, if the player with the second highest value is the only one who knows the distribution for the player with the highest value, then he may choose not to report his knowledge about the latter, so that he himself has the highest value in the 1-Lookahead mechanism and gets a high utility. That is why the mechanism only tries to sell to the player with the highest value. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9. For any additive auction instancesÎ = (N, M, D) and I = (N, M, D, G) , mechanism M CS1LA,j is 2-DST for each I j , and mechanism M CS1LA is 2-DST for I.
Proof. As in mechanism M CSA , in each mechanism M CS1LA,j , the fact that it is dominant for each player i to report his true value no matter what knowledge the players report follows from the truthfulness of the second-price mechanism and that of the 1-Lookahead mechanism. Given that all players report their true values, a player i's reported knowledge does not affect whether he is i * or not. It may affect the other players' utilities, but not his own. Thus reporting his true knowledge never hurts him, and mechanism M CS1LA,j is 2-DST for I j .
Since the players have additive valuations and M CS1LA runs each mechanism M CS1LA,j separately for item j, we have that M CS1LA is 2-DST for I and Lemma 9 holds.
Proof. When the players report their true values and true knowledge, the outcome of each M CS1LA,j on the crowdsourced Bayesian instance I j is the same as that of mechanism M 1LA on the Bayesian instanceÎ j , because the distribution for i * is reported. Accordingly,
where the inequality is because the 1-Lookahead mechanism is a 2-approximation to the optimal Bayesian mechanism for each item j [49] . Thus Lemma 10 holds.
Note that the approximation ratio of M CS1LA does not depend on the specific value of k, as long as k ≥ 1.
The Crowdsourced BV CG Mechanism. The mechanism M CSBV CG is defined in Mechanism 6. It is similar to M CSA and approximates mechanism BV CG in crowdsourced Bayesian settings. If a player i's value distributions are not all reported, M CSBV CG throws i away and leaves his winning set unsold. This simplifies the instructions compared to M CSA and still ensures truthfulness. Doing so would seriously damage the revenue if the knowledge graphs can be totally arbitrary. However, when everything is known by somebody and when the players report their true knowledge, no player is actually thrown away. We have the following two lemmas. 
4:
5:
If not all m distributions of i's values are reported, i gets no item and items in M i are unsold.
6:
Otherwise, let D ′ i be the vector of reported distributions for i's values (if there are more than one reporters for an item, take the lexicographically first).
7:
Compute the entry fee e i (D ′ i , b −i ) using BV CG. Note that different from mechanism Bund, BV CG does not compute extra reserve prices for i.
8:
; otherwise i gets no item and the items in M i are unsold. 9: end for sells to player i in the same way as BV CG: using the other players' highest reported value as the reserve price for each item, either player i gets the whole set of items for which his value passes the reserve price (i.e., his winning set), or he gets nothing and those items are unsold to anybody. Following [54] , it is dominant for i to report his true values given any entry fee that does not depend on his reported values, so is it when the entry fee is computed based on D ′ i and b −i . Moreover, a player i's reported knowledge K i about others affects neither M i nor e i , nor the reserve prices for him. Thus reporting his true knowledge never hurts him and Lemma 11 holds.
Rev(BV CG(Î)).
Proof. Since M CSBV CG retrieves the whole distribution D from the players, its outcome is exactly the same as that of BV CG under the Bayesian instanceÎ.
Remark. Similar to M CS1LA , the revenue of M CSBV CG does not depend on the specific value of k, as long as k ≥ 1. Indeed, notice the special structures of the two Bayesian mechanisms M 1LA and BV CG: the winning set of a player i solely depends on the players' values; the distribution D i is only used to compute better reserve prices or entry fee to increase revenue; and the distribution D −i is irrelevant to i. Therefore, in the crowdsourced setting we can allow a player to be both a reporter about the others' distributions and a potential buyer of some items. In some other mechanisms such as Myerson's mechanism, all players' distributions are used both to choose the potential winner and to set his price, thus in the crowdsourced setting we must separate the knowledge reporters and the potential winners.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5. (N, M, D, G) where G is k-bounded, the mechanism M ′ CSA is 2-DST and
Proof. Recall that mechanism M ′ CSA is defined as follows: when k ≤ 7, it runs M CSBV CG with probability 2 11 and M CS1LA with probability 9 11 ; when k > 7, it runs M CSBV CG with probability
and M CSIM with probability
CSA is clearly 2-DST, since all the sub-mechanisms are 2-DST, and which mechanism is chosen does not depend on the players' strategies.
When k ≤ 7, we have In each round, the mechanism keeps in S the player with the highest virtual value so far, drops all the other players from S, and adds the players whose distributions are reported for the first time by the dropped ones.
(1) φ i (·; D ′ i ) is monotone in its input; (2) i gets the item if and only if i = i * in all rounds ℓ with ℓ ≥ r and his virtual value is at least 0; and (3) when i gets the item, K i is never used by the mechanism and thus does not affect the execution of any round ℓ with ℓ ≥ r.
Accordingly, the mechanism is monotone in player i's reported value: if i gets the item by reporting some value, then he still gets it by reporting a higher value. Moreover, when i gets the item, his price in Step 13 is the threshold payment. Following standard characterizations of single-parameter DST mechanisms, it is the best for player i to report his true value v i . That is,
and Claim 3 holds.
Claim 4. For any player i, true value v i , true knowledge K i , knowledge K ′ i , and knowledge subprofile
Proof. Similar to Claim 3, conditional on a = i, player i does not get the item no matter what knowledge he reports. Thus
Next, we compare the two utilities conditional on a = i. Again similar to Claim 3, D ′ i is the same under both strategies of i, and the mechanism's execution is also the same till the round r where D ′ i is defined (or till the end if D ′ i is not defined). There are three cases:
is used by the mechanism, and i has utility 0 under both strategies.
• If D ′ i is defined and i = i * from round r to the end of the mechanism, then again K i and K ′ i are not used. Thus i has the same utility (maybe non-zero) under both strategies.
• If D ′ i is defined and i = i * starting from some round r ′ ≥ r, then i does not get the item under either strategy, thus his utility is 0 under both of them.
) and reporting his true knowledge does not hurt player i. N, M, D, G) where G is 2-connected, M CSM is 2-DST and
Proof. Following Lemma 13, it remains to show E v∼D Rev(M CSM (I)) ≥ (1 − 1 n )OP T (Î) under the players' truthful strategies. The key is to explore the structure of the knowledge graph to make sure that the player with the highest virtual value is found by the mechanism with high probability.
More specifically, arbitrarily fix the player a chosen by the mechanism. Notice that throughout the mechanism, N ′ is the set of players i ∈ N \ {a} such that D ′ i is not defined. We show that N ′ = ∅ at the end of the mechanism. Indeed, since G is 2-connected, the out-degree of a in G is at least 2: otherwise, either a cannot reach any other node in G, or this becomes the case after removing the unique node j with (a, j) ∈ G, contradicting 2-connectedness. Since a reports his true knowledge K a , we have |S| ≥ 2 in Step 3 and the mechanism does not stop there. Moreover, at the beginning of each round, we have |S| ≥ 2 and thus S \ {i * } = ∅: otherwise S ′ = ∅ in the previous round, and the mechanism would not have reached this round.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction that the mechanism finally reaches a round r where N ′ = ∅ at the beginning but S ′ = ∅ in Step 6. Since all players report their true knowledge, by the definition of S ′ we have that, in graph G, all neighbors of S \ {i * } are in N \ N ′ . Furthermore, for any player i ∈ (N \ N ′ ) \ S, all neighbors of i are also in N \ N ′ : indeed, i has been moved from N ′ to S and then dropped from S (except player a, whose neighbors are in N \ N ′ by definition); and when i is dropped from S, all his neighbors in N ′ are moved to S. Accordingly, all the edges going from N \ N ′ to N ′ are from player i * , and G becomes disconnected after removing i * , again contradicting 2-connectedness. Thus S ′ = ∅ in all rounds and N ′ = ∅ in the end, as we wanted to show.
Because all players report their true values and true knowledge, we have
To see why this is true, note that by construction, in each round the mechanism keeps the player with the highest virtual value in S. Thus, the final player i * has the highest virtual value in N \ {a}, and φ second is the second highest virtual value in N \ {a}. Accordingly, the outcome of Step 13 is the same as that of Myerson's mechanism onÎ a , so is the revenue. Therefore Equation 25 holds. Finally, it remains to show that, by throwing away a random player a, the mechanism does not lose much revenue. For each player i, letting P i (OP T (Î)) be the expected price paid by i in Myerson's mechanism underÎ, we have OP T (Î) = i∈N P i (OP T (Î)). Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, consider the following Bayesian mechanism M ′ onÎ a : it runs Myerson's mechanism onÎ and then projects the outcome to players N \ {a}. It is easy to see that M ′ is DST, thus it cannot generate more revenue than OP T (Î a ). As the expected revenue of M ′ is i =a P i (OP T (Î)), we have
Combining Equations 25 and 26, we have
and Theorem 6 holds.
C Using Scoring Rules to Buy Knowledge from Players
In this section we use proper scoring rules to reward the players for their knowledge, so that it is strictly better for them to report truthfully. More precisely, a scoring rule is a function f that takes as inputs a distribution D ′ over a state space Ω and a random sample ω from an underlying true distribution D over Ω, and outputs a real number. Scoring rule f is proper if
for any D and D ′ , and strictly proper if the inequality is strict for any 
where D ′ (s) is the probability of s according to D ′ , and δ ω,s is the indicator for ω = s. Note that BSR(D ′ , ω) ∈ [0, 2] for any D ′ and ω. 10 In all our mechanisms, when player i reports D i i ′ j = ⊥ for player i ′ and item j, the seller rewards i based on BSR(D i i ′ j , b i ′ j ). If there are more than one reporters for the same distribution, the seller can either reward all of them or randomly choose one. We can scale the reward for each distribution so that the total reward given to the players is at most some constant ǫ, which is an ǫ additive loss to the revenue. For example, in Mechanism M CSU D , the seller could reward each player i with
for reporting the value distribution of player i ′ on item j.
Although scoring rules help breaking utility-ties, they cause another problem: a player who does not know a distribution may report something he made up, just to receive a reward. Therefore we start by considering our mechanisms under the no-bluff assumption: that is, a player will not report anything about a distribution that he does not know. More precisely, a player i in a crowdsourced Bayesian auction is no-bluff if, for any knowledge graph G j and player i ′ with (i, i ′ ) / ∈ G j , and for any strategy (b i , K i ) of i, i reports ⊥ for the corresponding distribution of i ′ . Note that for a player i ′ with (i, i ′ ) ∈ G j , i may report any distribution about i ′ , including ⊥. In some sense, the no-bluff assumption is the analogy of the no-overbidding assumption adopted in budget-constrained auctions: a player will not bid higher than his true value or budget, even if doing so may not lead to a price higher than the latter. For all our mechanisms, it is easy to see that the reward will only affect the players' incentives for reporting their knowledge, not their incentives for reporting their values. Accordingly, it is still dominant for the players to report their true values, no matter what knowledge they report. Given that the players all report their true values, the reported values are distributed according to the prior. Thus reporting his true knowledge is now strictly better than lying for a player, because it maximizes his reward. Rather than restating all our previous theorems, we summarize them in the theorem below.
Theorem 7.
Under the no-bluff assumption, for any crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism in previous sections, the revised mechanism with proper scoring rules is 2-DST, and reporting his true knowledge is strictly better than lying for each player i. Moreover, the mechanism's revenue is the same as before with an ǫ additive loss.
Next, we show how to remove the no-bluff assumption when everything is known. Without this assumption, player i may report a distribution for another player i ′ 's value for an item j, even if (i, i ′ ) / ∈ G j . However, if there exists a third playerî who knows i ′ 's distribution D i ′ j , and if player i is also rewarded for playerî's report, then intuitively player i would have no incentive to bluff about i ′ . That is, not only a player is paid for reporting the distributions he knows, but he is also paid for keeping quiet about the distributions he does not know and letting the experts speak. Surely reporting D i ′ j maximizes player i's expected reward, but he does not have the information to decide what D i ′ j is. 11 Therefore, as long as reporting "⊥" gives player i the same utility as the unknown strategy of reporting D i ′ j , and as long as reporting any distribution other than D i ′ j gives him a strictly smaller utility, player i will report "⊥" about D i ′ j .
Taking mechanism M ′ CSU D in Section 4 as an example, the players are rewarded as follows:
• For each player i ′ and item j, let R i ′ j be the set of players who did not report "⊥" about the value of i ′ for j. Randomly select a playerî from R i ′ j and let r i ′ j = BSR(Dî i ′ j , b i ′ j ). Reward every player i = i ′ using r i ′ j , properly scaled.
Note that the reward r i ′ j is given to player i even if he has reported D i i ′ j = ⊥. It is easy to see that, for any k-bounded crowdsourced Bayesian instance with k ≥ 1, if all players except i report their true values and true knowledge, then player i's best strategy is to tell the truth about his own. Indeed, reporting his true values is still dominant no matter what knowledge the players' report. Moreover, for each player i ′ and item j, there are two ways for player i to maximize the reward r i ′ j he receives: (1) reporting D i i ′ j = ⊥, so thatî is chosen with probability 1 from the set of players who actually know D i ′ j ; or (2) successfully guessing D i ′ j and reporting it, so thatî's report is still D i ′ j with probability 1. Note that the latter is not a welldefined Bayesian strategy, because i does not have enough information to carry it out. Accordingly, the resulting crowdsourced mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC): that is, all players reporting their true values and true knowledge is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In fact, this is the only Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the mechanism, besides the unachieveable ones where each player reports the unknown true distributions. We again summarize our results in the theorem below.
Theorem 8. For any crowdsourced Bayesian mechanism in previous sections where the knowledge graph is at least 1-bounded, the revised mechanism does not rely on the no-bluff assumption, and all players reporting their true values and true knowledge is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the mechanism's revenue is the same as before with an ǫ additive loss.
When not everything is known and the players may bluff, a player may not report "⊥" about a distribution he does not know, because he may still get some reward in case nobody knows that distribution. It is an interesting open problem to design crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms when not everything is known and without the no-bluff assumption.
D Crowdsourced Bayesian Mechanisms with Efficient Communication
To improve the communication complexity of our mechanisms, rather than asking each player to report his known distributions in their entirety, the seller can make specific queries to the players about the distributions. Indeed, the query complexity of Bayesian auctions has been studied by [21] very recently, where the seller does not know the prior distributions but is given oracle accesses to them. More precisely, for any distribution D over reals, in a value query the seller sends a value v and the oracle returns the corresponding quantile q(v) = Pr x∼D [x ≥ v]. In a quantile query, the seller sends a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and the oracle returns the corresponding value v(q) such that Pr x∼D [x ≥ v(q)] = q.
In crowdsourced Bayesian auctions, as the players have knowledge about the distributions, it is very natural for the seller to use them as oracles. However, it is important to ensure that the queries to the players do not destroy their incentives to be truthful: both to report their true values and to report their true knowledge. 12 Fortunately, truthfulness in our mechanisms can be easily guaranteed by non-adaptive queries, where all the queries are made together, before the players report their values. As shown by [21] , when the players' value distributions are bounded within [1, H] for a given value H, the number of non-adaptive queries enough to approximate OP T in Bayesian auctions is polynomial in m and n, but only logarithmic in H, which is very efficient. Moreover, only value queries are needed in this case. When the distributions have unbounded supports but satisfy smalltail assumptions, non-adaptive quantile queries are enough, and the query complexity is polynomial in m, n and logarithmic in the cut-off value of the tail. We make the same queries in our mechanisms as in [21] .
Below we show how to revise our crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms to query the players, using mechanism M CSU D as an example and for bounded distributions. The mechanism now has a parameter ǫ > 0, which affects its approximation ratio.
• In Step 1, given ǫ > 0, let k = ⌈log 1+ǫ H⌉ and ν = (ν 0 , ν 1 , . . . , ν k−1 , ν k ) = (1, (1 + ǫ), (1 + ǫ) 2 , . . . , (1 + ǫ) k−1 , H).
Each player i reports, for each player i ′ = i and item j, either ⊥ or a non-increasing quantile vector q i i ′ j = (q i i ′ j;0 , . . . , q i i ′ j;k ), where q i i ′ j;0 = 1. Allegedly, q i i ′ j;l = q i ′ j (ν l ) for each l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where q i ′ j (·) is defined by D i ′ j . That is, if (i, i ′ ) ∈ G j then player i answers the value queries for distribution D i ′ j and value vector ν.
Simultaneously, each player i also reports a valuation b i = (b ij ) j∈M .
• In Step 5, if player i ∈ N 1 is the reporter for player i ′ ∈ N 2 and item j, then construct a discrete distribution D ′ i ′ j as follows: D ′ i ′ j (ν l ) = q i i ′ j;l − q i i ′ j;l+1 for every l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where q i i ′ j;k+1
0.
The other parts of the mechanism remain unchanged.
In the revised mechanism, it is still dominant for the players to report their true values, no matter how the queries are answered. Indeed, the fact that distribution D ′ ij is now different from D ij does not affect the players' truthfulness in the Bayesian mechanism M U D . Moreover, having player i answer the value queries for D i ′ j is equivalent to first having him report D i i ′ j and then having the seller answer the value queries accordingly. In the latter, reporting D i i ′ j truthfully never hurts player i, because i ∈ N 1 when his knowledge is used. Thus answering the value queries truthfully never hurts i either, and the mechanism is still 2-DST. Because the value queries for a distribution D i ′ j may be answered by all the other n − 1 players (when they all know D i ′ j ), the query complexity and thus the communication complexity of our mechanisms have an extra factor n compared with the query complexity in [21] .
More precisely, we state the following theorem for arbitrary knowledge graphs and bounded distributions. The proof is relatively easy following those for Section 3 and those in [21] , thus has been omitted. • for single-good auctions, with O(n 2 log 1+ǫ H) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at least OP T K (I) 4(1+ǫ) ;
• for unit-demand auctions, with O(mn 2 log 1+ǫ H) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at least
96(1+ǫ) ; and
• for additive auctions, with O(mn 2 log 1+ǫ H) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at least OP T K (I) 70(1+ǫ) . The case of unbounded distributions with small-tail assumptions, as well as the cases of kbounded knowledge graphs with k ≥ 1 and bounded/unbounded distributions, are similar. Indeed, the approximation ratios of our main results and the query complexity of Bayesian auctions in [21] combine nicely with each other, resulting in crowdsoruced Bayesian mechanisms with very efficient communication.
To further improve the communication complexity of our mechanisms, the seller can change them into extensive-form mechanisms and ask each player i to first report a bit about each pair (i ′ , j), indicating whether i knows D i ′ j or not. The seller then selects one reporter and only asks him to answer the oracle queries. By doing so, the extra factor n in the query complexity of our mechanisms can be dropped, with the players communicating O(n 2 m) bits besides the queries.
If scoring rules are used to buy the players' knowledge, then we can use the following value scoring rule g V to reward value queries, which follows directly from Brier's scoring rule [10] . More precisely, for any value query v ∈ R, letting x be a sample from the underlying value distribution and q be the answer of a reporter to the query, then g V (x, q; v) 1 + 2qI x≤v − q 2 .
To reward the players' answers to quantile queries, we define the following quantile scoring rule g Q , which is a variant of the one in [16] . More precisely, for any quantile query q ∈ [0, 1], letting x be a sample from the underlying value distribution and z be the answer of a reporter to the query, then g Q (x, z; q) q arctan z − (arctan z − arctan x)I z≥x .
Both scoring rules are strictly proper scoring rules with bounded ranges.
E Aggregating the Players' Refined Insider Knowledge
As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, since the common prior assumption implies that every player has correct and exact (that is, no more, no less) knowledge about all the distributions, in the main body of this paper we do not consider scenarios where the players have "insider" knowledge. Incorrect insider knowledge has been studied in [8, 2, 22, 23, 9] and is not the focus of this paper. However, sometimes each player may have correct insider knowledge about the other players' value distributions 13 : that is, his knowledge is a refinement of the prior. Different players' knowledge, although all correct, may refine the prior in different ways. For example, when the prior distribution of a player i's value for an item j is uniform over [0, 100], after v ij is drawn, another player i ′ may observe whether v ij ≥ 50 or not, and a third player i ′′ may observe whether v ij ∈ [20, 80] . Thus, player i ′ knows whether v ij is uniform over [0, 50] or (50, 100], depending on his signal; and player i ′′ knows whether v ij is uniform over [20, 80] or [0, 20)∪(80, 100], depending on the signal i ′′ observes.
The players' correct knowledge must be consistent with each other and one can obtain an even better refinement of the prior by combining their knowledge together. In the example above, if player i ′ observes v ij < 50 and player i ′′ observes v ij / ∈ [20, 80] , then it must be that v ij ∈ [0, 20) and the posterior distribution is uniform in this range. However, neither i ′ nor i ′′ knows this fact.
Enhanced knowledge graphs. To model the players' insider knowledge, we equip the knowledge graphs in the crowdsourced Bayesian setting with information sets. To begin with, for any two players i, i ′ and item j such that (i, i ′ ) ∈ G j , there is a partition P i i ′ j of the support of D i ′ j , representing the possible signals player i will observe about D i ′ j . After the true value v i ′ j is drawn, letting S(v i ′ j ) be the unique set in the partition that contains v i ′ j , player i learns the fact that player i ′ 's true value for j falls into S(v i ′ j ) and the posterior distribution is D i ′ j |S(v i ′ j ). More generally, the partitions may even depend on player i's own true valuation v i , because v i is part of the information he has. Because different values are independently drawn, given v i and the information sets observed by i for different distributions of the other players, i considers their posterior distributions to be independent.
All our mechanisms remain 2-DST with respect to the players' refined knowledge, where a player's true knowledge is now the posterior distributions known by him. Since the optimal Bayesian revenue increases when the distributions are refined [4] , the expected revenue of our mechanisms also increases, where the expectation is further taken over the private signals observed by the players. However, the revenue benchmark is still defined as before: that is, with respect to the prior and the knowledge graphs, without considering the refinements. An interesting open problem is to design crowdsourced Bayesian mechanisms whose revenue approximates a more demanding benchmark -the optimal revenue based on the "aggregated refinement" obtained by combining all players' refinements together.
